Contextualist Answers to the Challenge from Disagreement

Dan Zeman

Abstract


In this short paper I survey recent contextualist answers to the challenge from disagreement raised by contemporary relativists. After making the challenge vivid by means of a working example, I specify the notion of disagreement lying at the heart of the challenge. The answers are grouped in three categories, the first characterized by rejecting the intuition of disagreement in certain cases, the second by conceiving disagreement as a clash of non-cognitive attitudes and the third by relegating disagreement at the pragmatic level. For each category I present several important variants and raise some (general) criticisms. The paper is meant to offer a quick introduction to the current contextualist literature on disagreement and thus a useful tool for further research.


Keywords


contextualism; disagreement; disagreement in attitude; pragmatic disagreement; predicates of taste

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.13128/Phe_Mi-21106


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