Husserl’s Phenomenology of Validity

Susi Ferrarello


What is a practical intention, particularly an evaluating intention? Are values representational states that work differently from epistemological truths? Are our perceptual experiences representational states? To simplify the inquiry, I will theoretically divide the questions into two groups: the former concerning the distinction between signitive and practical intention and the latter pertaining to the objectivity of a value. The texts I will refer to are Husserl’s Ideas and Analysis.


intentionality; active and passive synthesis; signitive acts; value and teleology

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